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TO DISCHARGE OR NOT TO DISCHARGE:
TAX IS THE QUESTION
ABSTRACT
Prior to Congress passing BAPCPA in 2005, an individual was able to
discharge debt related to a tax return filed after April 15th as long as that
individual satisfied the Beard test and certain statutory requirements. Courts
applied the Beard test, which consists of four factors, to determine when a
document qualified as a valid tax return. Of these four factors, the fourth
factor, which requires that the debtor make an honest and reasonable attempt
to comply with the tax law, led to disputes among courts. All circuit courts
adopted the Beard test, and the major issue prior to the 2005 amendments
turned on whether an individual can satisfy the fourth factor of the Beard test if
that individual failed to file a tax return until after the IRS had already filed a
tax return on that individual’s behalf.
In an attempt to clarify the language of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
defined the term “return” in its 2005 amendments. The definition appears in
the hanging paragraph of § 523(a). Importantly, Congress stated that a
document is a return if the document “satisfies the requirements of applicable
bankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements).” In 2012, the Fifth
Circuit found in In re McCoy that the date on which a tax form is filed is one
of the “applicable filing requirements” that Congress was referencing in the
hanging paragraph. Thus, the Fifth Circuit created the “one-day-late rule”
when it held that a tax form filed one day late is not a valid tax return because
the filer has failed to satisfy applicable filing requirements. The result of the
one-day-late interpretation is that an individual who files a tax form late
cannot receive a discharge of debt stemming from that late-filed form. The
Tenth and First Circuits subsequently adopted the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation.
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, bankruptcy courts, academics, and the IRS
oppose the one-day-late interpretation and have offered an alternative
viewpoint. Courts opposing the one-day-late rule are concerned with the harsh
impact that the one-day-late interpretation has on honest debtors who file tax
forms late for reasons beyond the debtor’s control. While various courts
opposing the one-day-late rule have interpreted the hanging paragraph in
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slightly different ways, the common theme among these opinions is that a latefiled tax form can still qualify as a return if the filer satisfied the Beard test and
statutory requirements. Courts opposing the one-day-late rule maintain that
Congress did not intend for the hanging paragraph to displace the Beard test.
This Comment argues that Congress intended to codify the Beard test
through the BAPCPA amendments. Under this interpretation, the fourth
element of the Beard test requires that a court must always review a late-filed
tax form and make a subjective determination as to whether that form is a
return. The court must evaluate all relevant factors, including when the form
was filed, why it was filed late, and whether the IRS has filed a substitute
return on behalf of the individual who failed to file a timely return. This
interpretation allows the debtor an opportunity to show a reason for filing late
tax forms, and gives the court the opportunity to make a determination as to
the validity of the debtor’s reasoning. Ultimately, this interpretation allows
debtors to receive a fresh start without compromising the IRS’s ability to
collect taxes.
INTRODUCTION
April 15th, also known as “Tax Day” to most Americans, has been the date
by which individuals earning an income are expected to file their income tax
returns since 1955. Depending on whom you ask, Congress changed tax day
from its original February date to March, and finally April, in an effort to
either spread out the IRS’s workload or as a means of avoiding paying interest
on tax returns.1 While April 15th is technically tax day, this date is often not
the final date by which an individual must file his or her tax return without
penalty. The IRS has moved tax day for various reasons including extensions,
natural disasters, and holidays,2 and the IRS has the discretion to waive
penalties related to late-filed tax forms.3 Whether an individual does so
1 See Jessica Sung, Why is Tax Day April 15?, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2002), at 64, http://archive.fortune.
com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/04/15/321414/index.htm.
2 See Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Announces 2016 Filing Season Start Date – and a Delayed Tax Day,
FORBES (Dec. 21, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2015/12/21/irs-announces2016-filing-season-start-date-and-a-delayed-tax-day/#314e3802336a (noting tax day is on April 18, 2016 due
to emancipation day); Tax Relief in Disaster Situations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Relief-in-DisasterSituations (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (outlining the IRS’s list of natural disasters that have affected tax day).
3 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (2012) (“In case of failure to file any return . . . on the date prescribed therefor,
unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be
added to the amount required. . . .”) (emphasis added).
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strategically, unintentionally, or out of desperation, the late-filing of tax forms
are a common occurrence in America.4 Since Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) in 2005, the
question of whether debt arising from these late-filed tax forms is
dischargeable in chapter 7 has become an issue.
This Comment will analyze the one-day-late rule, which states that tax debt
arising from a late-filed tax form is nondischargeable in bankruptcy.5 Further,
this analysis will show that the one-day-late rule is a flawed interpretation of
§ 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). Section 523(a) states: “A
discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt—for a tax . . . with respect to which a return, or
equivalent report or notice, if required—was not filed or given.”6 This issue,
therefore, turns on whether a late-filed tax form can be considered a valid tax
return because an individual can only receive a discharge for tax debt if the
individual filed a valid tax return.
Prior to the passage of BAPCPA, the term “return,” as used in § 523(a),
was left undefined by the statute.7 Inconsistencies regarding various courts’
definitions of “return” led to the development of the four-part Beard test.8 The
Beard test classified a document as a return when the document: “(1) purported
to be a return; (2) [was] executed by the debtor under penalty of perjury; (3)
contain[ed] sufficient data to allow calculation of the tax; and (4) represent[ed]
an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law.”9
Of these factors, the fourth factor was the most important, leading to disputes
among the circuit courts.10 Although courts reached varying conclusions on
4 See Brian O’Connell, Why Do So Many People Fall Behind On Their Taxes?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 12,
2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/021214/why-do-so-many-people-fallbehind-their-taxes.asp (“In 2009 a spokesperson for the U.S. Internal Revenue Service estimated that 8.2
million Americans owed over $83 billion in back taxes, penalties and interest.”).
5 See Fahey v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Fahey), 779 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2015); Mallo v. IRS
(In re Mallo), 774 F.3d 1313, 1328 (10th Cir. 2014); McCoy v. Miss. State Tax Comm’n (In re McCoy), 666
F.3d 924, 932 (5th Cir. 2012).
6 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added).
7 See Maitland v. N.J., Div. of Taxation (In re Maitland), 531 B.R. 516, 518 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
8 See Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934); Beard v. Comm’r, 793 F.2d 139, 139 (6th
Cir. 1986) (per curiam), aff’g 82 T.C. 766 (1984); see also Hamer v. IRS (In re Hamer), 328 B.R. 825, 828,
832 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2005).
9 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 518, 526 n.13 (citing Beard, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), aff’d, 793 F.2d 139
(6th Cir. 1986)).
10 In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1058–59 (7th Cir. 2005) (identifying the issues with the “honest and
reasonable” standard).
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what constituted “an honest and reasonable attempt” to satisfy the tax law
requirements, all circuits adopted the Beard test for determining when a
chapter 7 debtor’s late-filed tax forms were a return.11
Congress’s decision to define the term “return” in the BAPCPA
amendments, however, threatened the future of the Beard test.12 This definition
appears after § 523(a)(19)(B), and the majority of courts refer to the definition
as the “hanging paragraph.”13 The hanging paragraph states:
For purposes of this subsection, the term “return” means a return that
satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including
applicable filing requirements). Such term includes a return prepared
pursuant to section 6020(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or
similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include
a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, or a similar state or local law.14

Although Congress did not clarify which filing requirements are “applicable,”
debtors who have outstanding tax debt at the time they file a chapter 7 petition
are the parties that this legislation has truly affected.15
Congress’s definition of “return” led courts to reach two different
conclusions when interpreting what constitutes a return for dischargeability
purposes. The courts following the Fifth Circuit’s holding in McCoy v.

11 See, e.g., id. at 1057; Moroney v. United States (In re Moroney), 352 F.3d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Hindenlang (In re Hindenlang), 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir. 1999).
12 11 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ TX12.039[2][a][ii] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed.).
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). Many courts have adopted the * to refer to the hanging paragraph, and I
will use this identifying language throughout this Comment. Furthermore, the term “hanging paragraph” in this
Comment will refer to § 523(a)(*), not the other “hanging paragraph,” which follows and addresses
§ 1325(a)(9): whether a debtor can strip down the lien of a secured creditor under the terms of § 1325(a)(9)
when the collateral is a motor vehicle purchased by the debtor for personal use within 910 days of the filing of
the petition. See id. § 1325(a)(9); In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269, 271 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006).
14 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*). “Section 6020(a) returns are those in which a taxpayer who has failed to file his
or her returns on time nonetheless discloses all information necessary for the IRS to prepare a substitute return
that the taxpayer can then sign and submit.” In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 2012). “[A] § 6020(b)
return is one in which the taxpayer submits either no information or fraudulent information, and the IRS
prepares a substitute [for] return [‘SFR’] based on the best information it can collect independently.” Id.
15 11 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ TX12.039[2][a][ii].
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Mississippi State Tax Commission (In re McCoy)16 found that a tax debt
resulting from a tax form filed even one day late is not dischargeable because
timely filing is a part of the “applicable filing requirements” discussed in the
hanging paragraph.17 Proponents of the one-day-late rule are not concerned
with the reason that the debtor filed his tax forms late because, under this view,
a late-filed tax form can never be a valid return for dischargeability purposes
unless the form is “prepared pursuant to section 6020(a).”18 A § 6020(a) return
is a late-filed tax form prepared by the IRS with the assistance of the individual
who failed to file a timely return.19 Unlike a § 6020(b) return, which is
prepared by the IRS without assistance from the filer and will be discussed
later, Congress stated in the hanging paragraph that § 6020(a) forms are still
valid despite the fact that they are always filed after April 15th.20 Additionally,
the IRS has full discretion to allow or deny an individual the opportunity to file
a return under § 6020(a) if that individual has failed to file a timely return.21
The practical result of the one-day-late rule is that an individual cannot
receive a discharge on any tax debt resulting from a late-filed tax form unless
the IRS chooses to allow the individual to file a § 6020(a) return.22 While the
First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have all issued opinions subscribing to this
view, the logic behind the one-day-late rule has led to questions about the
seemingly harsh impact that this policy has on many debtors.23 For example, in
Mallo v. IRS (In re Mallo), the Tenth Circuit specifically held that courts do
not need to evaluate whether a debtor made an honest and reasonable attempt
to satisfy the requirements of the tax law because filing deadline dates are part
16 666 F.3d at 932 (holding that because the debtor’s 1998 and 1998 returns were filed late, they did not
constitute “returns” for discharge purposes). The rule established in In re McCoy will be hereinafter referred to
as the “one-day-late rule.”
17 See, e.g., In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1328 (10th Cir.
2014). See generally In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (“[The debtor’s] 1998 and 1999 returns did not comply
with the filing requirements of applicable Mississippi tax law and were, therefore, not ‘returns’ for discharge
purposes.”).
18 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*).
19 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 928 (“Section 6020(a) returns are those in which a taxpayer who has
failed to file his or her returns on time nonetheless discloses all information necessary for the IRS to prepare a
substitute return that the taxpayer can then sign and submit.”).
20 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*).
21 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(a) (2012).
22 See, e.g., In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1328 (holding that debt resulting from a late-filed 1040 federal tax
return was not dischargeable in bankruptcy); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (holding that debt resulting from a
late-filed state tax return was not dischargeable in bankruptcy).
23 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1327; In re McCoy, 666
F.3d at 931.
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of the applicable filing requirements that Congress discussed in the hanging
paragraph.24 While Congress never mentioned displacing the Beard test in the
BAPCPA amendments, the one-day-late rule is, in effect, a complete departure
from the Beard test.25
The second group of courts, which includes the Ninth Circuit, various
district courts, and bankruptcy courts, have held that a late-filed tax form can
be a return, and the debt can be dischargeable as long as the Beard test and
applicable Code requirements have been met.26 Two further splits exist among
the courts holding that a late-filed tax form can be a return. While some courts
opposing the one-day-late rule have held that a debt resulting from a late-filed
tax form is only dischargeable if the individual seeking a discharge filed tax
forms prior to the IRS filing a § 6020(b) substitute return27 on the taxpayer’s
behalf, other courts have held that a debt stemming from a late-filed return
may be dischargeable even after the IRS files a § 6020(b) substitute return.28
Additionally, the latter group of courts is further split regarding what
additional factors a court must look at to determine if an individual has
complied with the fourth prong of the Beard test.29

24

In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1320.
See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 521, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
26 See Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), 828 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct.
13, 2016) (No. 16-497); In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 521; McBride v. City of Kettering (In re McBride), 534
B.R. 326, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015); Martin v. IRS (In re Martin) (Martin I), 508 B.R. 717, 736 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); Rhodes v. United States (In
re Rhodes), 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013). At the time of publication, the Supreme Court had not
yet accepted or rejected the petition for certiorari in In re Smith.
27 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b)(1) (2012). Section 6020(b) forms are late-filed tax forms filed by the IRS on
behalf of an individual with no confirmation or signature from the individual filer. See id.
28 Compare Pitts v. United States (In re Pitts), 497 B.R. 73, 81 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that “if
the late return was filed prior to any assessment by the IRS, then the taxes would be dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(1)(B)”), aff’d, 515 B.R. 317 (C.D. Cal. 2014), with Martin I, 508 B.R. at 731 (“[T]he Court is
persuaded that the most reasonable and consistent interpretation of the hanging paragraph comes from the
minority no time-limit-approach, derived from the Eighth Circuit’s Pre-BAPCPA decision in Colsen also
applying the Beard test.”).
29 Compare United States v. Martin (In re Martin) (Martin II), 542 B.R. 479, 491 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the court must look at the “number of missing returns, the length of the delay, the reasons for the
delay, and any other circumstances reasonably pertaining to the honesty and reasonableness of the [debtor’s]
efforts”), with Briggs v. IRS (In re Briggs), 511 B.R. 707, 719 (Bankr. N.D. GA. 2014) (“The focus on the
‘honest and reasonable’ inquiry under the Beard test should therefore be whether the debtor’s filing represents
his honest attempt to reasonably convey accurate information regarding the debtor’s wages, deductions, and
allowances.”).
25
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Therefore, three viewpoints exist among the courts opposing the one-daylate rule: (1) a late filed tax form can only be a return if the form is filed prior
to the IRS filing a § 6020(b) substitute return on the filer’s behalf;30 (2) the IRS
filing a § 6020(b) return is one of many factors that a court must consider when
determining if a late filed form is a return;31 and (3) the IRS filing a § 6020(b)
return has no effect on this determination, and a late-filed form is a return if the
document is useful to the IRS at the time of filing.32
The three viewpoints opposing the one-day-late rule center around the ideas
that the BAPCPA amendments should not displace the Beard test, and that
Congress’s definition of “return” is harmonious with the pre-BAPCPA Beard
test.33 These courts agree that a late-filed tax form can meet the definition of a
return in certain situations. For example, in Maitland v. New Jersey, Division
of Taxation (In re Maitland), the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court held that a
debtor’s tax documents, which were filed one year late, constituted a return
because the debtor satisfied the four elements of the Beard test.34 The court
based its opinion on both the rules of statutory interpretation and Judge
Easterbrook’s dissent in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Payne.35 While
the majority in In re Payne did not rely on the language in the hanging
paragraph (because the debt in question arose prior to the effective date of
BAPCPA),36 Judge Easterbrook used his dissent to explain that late-filed forms
are still “returns” before he correctly predicted that the language in the
BAPCPA amendments will lead courts to preclude debts arising from these
returns from dischargeability.37 Following In re Payne, many courts opposing
the one-day-late rule have relied on Judge Easterbrook’s idea that “[j]udges
30

See In re Pitts, 497 B.R. at 83–84.
See Martin II, 542 B.R. at 490–91.
32 See In re Briggs, 511 B.R. at 715, 719.
33 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); see also Martin I, 508 B.R. at 731; In re
Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).
34 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 520.
35 See id. (discussing Judge Easterbrook’s dissent from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Payne, 431
F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
36 When evaluating the various court decisions on this topic, it is important to remember that any holding
involving a bankruptcy petition filed before the effective date of BAPCPA (October 17, 2005) was not
analyzed under the language of the hanging paragraph.
37 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“After the 2005 legislation, an
untimely return can not lead to a discharge—recall that the new language refers to ‘applicable nonbankruptcy
law (including applicable filing requirements).’ But to say that a document came too late to allow a discharge
in cases commenced after October 2005 (when the amendment took effect) is not to say that it wasn’t a
‘return’ in 1992, when [a debtor] filed it, or for that matter today.”).
31
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should not fiddle with the definition of ‘return’ so that one word covers all
important steps in a system of self-assessment”38 to support the notion that
Congress intended for the hanging paragraph’s definition of “return” to be a
codified version of the long-standing Beard test.39
Although Congress passed the BAPCPA amendments in an effort to clarify
certain ambiguities within the Code, there is no evidence that Congress
intended to impose a strict temporal deadline that would cost struggling
Americans the ability to discharge their income tax debts in bankruptcy.
Ultimately, the one-day-late interpretation is flawed, largely due to the
unnecessarily harsh result that it has on honest, law-abiding debtors. Courts
following the one-day-late interpretation are punishing debtors, who previously
would have had access to a discharge, without any consideration as to the
reasoning behind the debtor’s late filing. It is commonly understood that the
purpose of bankruptcy is “to grant a fresh start to the ‘honest but unfortunate
debtor.’”40 “When a dispute [regarding § 523] arises, these exceptions to
discharge should be strictly construed against the creditor in light of the ‘fresh
start’ policy underlying the Code.”41 Although it may not be possible in every
debtor’s case, American courts have long applied these principles when
interpreting the Code.42
The issue that this Comment addresses should be resolved through an
evaluation of Congress’s intent in light of the purpose of bankruptcy in
America. As a result, this Comment argues that the court’s analysis in United
States v. Martin (In re Martin) (“Martin II”), which was recently adopted by
the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), is the correct interpretation of
the hanging paragraph and proposes an amendment to § 523(a)(*) that will
help clarify Congress’s definition of “return.”43
38

Id. at 1061.
See Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006); In re Maitland, 531 B.R.
at 520; In re McBride, 534 B.R. 326, 336 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2015).
40 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[Bankruptcy law] gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for the future, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of preexisting debt.”); In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 521 (citing Marrama v. Citizens Bank
of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007)).
41 Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 722–23 (Bankr. E.D. Cal 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); see also In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992).
42 See Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244–45.
43 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 488–91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Beard test still applies
following the BAPCPA amendments); see also In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2016), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) (No. 16-497).
39
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BACKGROUND
I. DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT STEMMING FROM LATE-FILED TAX FORMS
PRIOR TO BAPCPA
Prior to BAPCPA, many debtors were able to discharge tax debt in chapter
7 as long as they satisfied certain rules. Under the pre-BAPCPA rules, the
majority of courts allowed for an individual to discharge debt resulting from a
late-filed, non-fraudulent tax form when the Beard test44 and the following four
statutory requirements were met: (1) three years had passed from the time that
the tax return leading to the debt was due;45 (2) the tax return was filed more
than two years prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy petition;46 (3) at least 240 days
had passed since the date of an IRS assessment;47 and (4) the individual filing
the return had not engaged in a willful attempt to evade the tax law.48 The
central issue before the BAPCPA amendments turned on the question of
whether an individual’s late-filed tax forms could comply with the fourth
prong of the Beard test, which required an honest attempt to satisfy the
requirements of the tax law, if the individual filed the form after the IRS
already assessed that individual’s tax liability.49
A. The Post-Assessment Issue
Before Congress passed the BAPCPA amendments in 2005, the majority of
courts agreed that a late-filed tax form could be a “return” for § 523(a)
purposes if the Beard test was satisfied.50 Further, the majority of courts found
44

See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 518 (stating that the Beard test classified a document as a return when
the document “(1) purport[ed] to be a return; (2) [was] executed by the debtor under penalty of perjury; (3)
contain[ed] sufficient data to allow calculation of the tax; and (4) represent[ed] an honest and reasonable
attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law”).
45 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B) (2012).
46 See id. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii).
47 See id. § 523(a)(1)(A).
48 See id. § 523(a)(1)(C); see also Donald A. Ariail et al., Discharging Taxes in Bankruptcy, J.
ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 2010, at 58, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/aug/20102591.html.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Klein (In re Klein), 312 B.R. 443, 447 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“The question
considered by the Bankruptcy Court here relates to the [h]onest and [r]easonable [a]ttempt prong of the Beard
test. The narrow issue is whether Appellee’s 1990 and 1991 1040 Forms, filed after the IRS prepared SFRs
and assessed taxes (‘post-assessment’), constitute an honest and reasonable attempt by Appellee to satisfy the
requirements of the tax law.”); United States v. Ralph (In re Ralph), 266 B.R. 217, 220 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“The
dispute in this case revolves around whether the Forms 1040EZ filed by Debtor Donna Ralph in 1995
constitute an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law.”).
50 In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 2005) (listing circuits that have adopted the Beard test).
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that debt arising from a late-filed return was dischargeable in cases where the
debtor made an honest and reasonable attempt to file his or her own return
prior to the IRS filing a substitute return on the debtor’s behalf.51 Circuit courts
that dealt with late-filed tax forms filed prior to an assessment disagreed,
however, as to when a debtor’s late-filed return constituted an honest and
reasonable attempt to satisfy the tax law.52 Further, a split exists among circuit
courts regarding whether tax debt stemming from a tax form filed after the IRS
already assessed a debtor’s liability constituted as an honest and reasonable
attempt.
An IRS assessment is a determination of how much an individual taxpayer
owes in taxes and penalties.53 This assessment typically occurs immediately
after an individual files his or her own tax return.54 In cases where an
individual has failed to file a timely return, the IRS will send a notice alerting
the individual of his or her failure to file.55 If the individual responds to the
notice, the IRS has discretion to allow the individual, with assistance of the
IRS, to file a § 6020(a) return.56 If the individual does not respond to the
notice, the IRS will eventually prepare a § 6020(b) substitute return on behalf
of that individual.57 The IRS will then notify the individual of the § 6020(b)
substitute return.58 At this point, the IRS recommends that the debtor file tax
forms even after a § 6020(b) form is filed on the debtor’s behalf because “[t]he
IRS will generally adjust your account to reflect the correct figures.”59 Finally,
if the individual does not respond to the notice or execute the § 6020(b)
substitute return the IRS prepared, the IRS will assess the individual’s liability
based on any data that the IRS has access to at that time.60 Following

51 See In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We hold then that income tax forms
unjustifiably filed years late, where the IRS has already prepared substitute returns and assessed taxes, do not
constitute ‘returns’ for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i).”); In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th
Cir. 1999).
52 See, e.g., In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034 (explaining the further circuit split).
53 See Vince Bethel, The IRS Assessment and Demand Process, HOUS. CHRON., http://smallbusiness.
chron.com/irs-assessment-demand-process-22721.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2016).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(a) (2012).
57 Filing Past Due Tax Returns, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-SelfEmployed/Filing-Past-Due-Tax-Returns (last updated June 9, 2016).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See Bethel, supra note 53.
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confirmation of the individual’s liability, the IRS will continue to seek
payment on the original tax liability and any penalties that may have accrued.61
While the Beard test contains four elements, the fourth element, which
states that a tax form must represent an honest and reasonable attempt to
satisfy the requirements of the tax law,62 is the element that has led to the most
disagreement among courts.63 This disagreement stems from each court’s effort
to determine what constitutes an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the
requirements of the tax law.
B. The Minority View of the Post-Assessment Issue
Prior to the BAPCPA amendments, post-assessment tax forms were
evaluated based on the court’s analysis of the debtor’s compliance with the
fourth element of the Beard test.64 This methodology led some courts to
conclude that late-filed post-assessment tax forms are returns (and thus
dischargeable) if they meet both the Beard test and applicable Code
requirements,65 because “[t]o be a return, a form is required to ‘evince’ an
honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the laws [and] [t]his does not require
inquiry into the circumstances under which a document was filed.”66 Under this
view, courts examined whether the filer included the necessary information in
his tax forms, as opposed to the time or manner in which the forms were
filed.67

61

Filing Past Due Tax Returns, supra note 57.
See 26 U.S.C. § 6011(a) (2012) (“When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary any person
made liable for any tax imposed by this title, or with respect to the collection thereof, shall make a return or
statement according to the forms and regulations prescribed by the Secretary. Every person required to make a
return or statement shall include therein the information required by such forms or regulations.”).
63 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 518 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
64 See, e.g., In re Klein, 312 B.R. 443, 447 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“The question considered by the Bankruptcy
Court here relates to the [h]onest and [r]easonable [a]ttempt prong of the Beard test. The narrow issue is
whether Appellee’s 1990 and 1991 1040 Forms, filed after the IRS prepared SFRs and assessed taxes (‘postassessment’), constitute an honest and reasonable attempt by Appellee to satisfy the requirements of the tax
law.”); In re Ralph, 266 B.R. 217, 220 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“The dispute in this case revolves around whether the
Forms 1040EZ filed by Debtor Donna Ralph in 1995 constitute an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the
law.”).
65 See supra text accompanying notes 36–39.
66 In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006).
67 See In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (citing In re Colsen, 446 F.3d at 840; and
then citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2005) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
62
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Courts opposing the one-day-late rule have consistently cited language
from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen)
and Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in In re Payne to support the idea that
Congress never intended to restrict what constitutes a return based on a strict
time-based deadline.68 In re Payne involved an individual’s failure to file a tax
return between 1986 and 1992.69 In 1990, the IRS assessed Payne’s liability for
his 1986 income. Payne finally filed his 1986 return in 1992 and later sought to
have his 1986 debt discharged through a 1997 bankruptcy filing.70 While the
majority in In re Payne held that the debtor’s late-filed form did not comply
with the Beard test, Judge Easterbrook used his dissent to show why a latefiled form should still be considered a return.71
Judge Easterbrook’s concern with the majority’s opinion in In re Payne
centered around the majority’s view that a document “filed after the authorities
have borne [the] burden [of calculating the amount due] does not serve the
purpose of the filing requirement.”72 As Judge Easterbrook noted, the IRS does
not agree with the majority’s view: “Any taxpayer who wants to propose a
compromise of his tax liabilities must file a return, even if the Service already
has gone to the trouble of calculating and assessing the tax without his help.”73
The Treasury Department, therefore, must believe that a late-filed postassessment filing has some use, or the department would not have gone
through the trouble to include this requirement within the Treasury
Regulations.74 Judge Easterbrook explained that a form filed post-assessment
can still be useful because it provides concrete facts regarding the filer’s tax
information, and these facts can then replace the estimates that the IRS must
rely on when filing a § 6020(b) substitute return on behalf of an individual who
filed no return at all.75
While Judge Easterbrook primarily attacked the courts that support the
notion that a tax form filed after an IRS assessment is useless and therefore not
a return, he also correctly predicted that courts would likely interpret BAPCPA

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 520; In re Briggs, 511 B.R. 707, 718 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2014).
431 F.3d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id.
See id. at 1060–61 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1057 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1060 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing 26 C.F.R § 301.7122-1(d)).
Id.
Id.
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to preclude discharging any debt resulting from a late-filed tax form.76 Despite
Judge Easterbrook’s correct prediction, his explanation of why a postassessment tax form is still useful lends support to the idea that a tax form filed
after April 15th should be considered a return, because the form remains useful
to the IRS regardless of the date on which the form was filed.77
In re Colsen, a 2006 Eighth Circuit decision, was the last circuit court
decision that relied on the pre-BAPCPA language to form its opinion.78 In re
Colsen involved an individual who failed to file his income tax returns from
1992 through 1996.79 The IRS assessed his liability in 1999, and Mr. Colsen
filed his returns a few months after the assessment. Mr. Colsen eventually filed
a bankruptcy petition in 2003 and sought to have his debt resulting from these
late-filed forms discharged.80
The Eighth Circuit concluded that timely filing is not relevant when
determining if a document is a return81 and relied heavily on Judge
Easterbrook’s dissent from In re Payne.82 Specifically, the court based its
holding on Judge Easterbrook’s two suggestions that (1) timely filing and
satisfaction of one’s financial obligations are requirements distinct from the
definition of a “return,” and (2) “the relevant legal provisions were the ones
that required the taxpayers yield all financial information necessary for
calculation of their tax liabilities.”83 The relevant legal provision prior to
BAPCPA was the Beard test, and the court determined that “it had been
offered no persuasive reason to create a more subjective definition of ‘return’
that is dependent on the facts and circumstances of a taxpayer’s filing.”84 Judge
Easterbrook’s notion that courts should focus on the content of the tax forms
led the Eighth Circuit to hold that the fourth factor of the Beard test, which
76

See id. at 1060–61.
See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (“Judge Easterbrook noted that ‘timely
filing and satisfaction of one’s financial obligations are requirements distinct from the definition of a “return”’
and he argued that the relevant legal provisions were the ones that require taxpayers yield all financial
information necessary for calculation of their tax liabilities.”) (quoting In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1061)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
78 446 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2006) (“But we do not apply that [BAPCPA] language here because Mr.
Colsen’s bankruptcy petition was filed before the Act’s effective date.”).
79 See id. at 838.
80 See id.
81 Id. at 840.
82 See id. (citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060–63 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
83 Id. (citing In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1060–61 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
84 Id.
77
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requires that a filer’s tax forms must represent an honest and reasonable
attempt to comply with tax law, should be evaluated based on whether the
individual filer’s tax forms provide accurate and necessary information,
regardless of the time that the individual filed his forms.85
Additionally, the court in In re Colsen rejected the argument that a latefiled form can never be useful to the IRS.86 The reason that a post-assessment,
late-filed form is useful is because the form still helps the IRS accurately
calculate the filer’s liability.87 If an individual never files a tax form, the IRS
must calculate that individual’s liability without having access to that
individual’s complete financial records. Even though the late-filed form in In
re Colsen did not allow the IRS to collect more taxes, the IRS still had a role in
determining the debtor’s liability following the late-filed forms because the
court considered “the accurate calculation of a taxpayer’s obligations . . . to be
a valid purpose that satisfies the tax laws.”88
C. The Majority View of the Post-Assessment Issue
Conversely, the majority of courts reached the conclusion that, absent
extreme extenuating circumstances, late-filed tax forms are not returns once
the IRS has assessed a penalty because a late-filed return serves no purpose
once the IRS has assessed a debtor’s liability.89 The result of the majority view
is that an individual who misses the April 15th filing date and fails to file tax
forms before the IRS assesses a penalty against that individual is barred from
receiving a discharge of the tax debt related to the late-filed forms. Courts
following this view focused primarily on the debtor’s act of filing late, as
opposed to the content of the tax forms, and made a blanket determination that
an assessment is essentially the last time that the IRS has any use for an
individual’s tax forms.90
The Fourth,91 Sixth,92 Seventh,93 and Ninth Circuits94 issued opinions
following this majority view. These circuits held that the fourth prong of the
85

Id.
Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 841.
89 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058; In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 904 (4th Cir. 2003); In re
Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir. 1999).
90 In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058; In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 904; In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034.
91 In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 904.
86
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Beard test turns on the subjective intent of the debtor in attempting to comply
with the tax laws, as opposed to the usefulness of the late-filed document.95
Under the majority view, a tax form filed after the IRS performed an
assessment is not dischargeable because “forms filed after an involuntary
assessment do not serve the purposes of the tax system.”96
The majority view originated in United States v. Hindenlang (In re
Hindenlang), a 1999 Sixth Circuit decision where the court presented the view
that the fourth factor of the Beard test creates a strong presumption that tax
forms filed after an IRS assessment are not returns.97 In re Hindenlang
involved an individual who failed to file his income tax returns for the years
1985 through 1988.98 The IRS prepared substitute returns in 1990 and received
no response from Mr. Hindenlang.99 Finally, the IRS assessed Mr. Hindelang’s
liability in 1991. Mr. Hindenlang filed his missing returns in 1993 and later
filed a bankruptcy petition in 1996.100 Mr. Hindenlang sought to have his debt
resulting from the 1985 through 1988 tax years discharged.101
The Sixth Circuit evaluated the fourth prong of the Beard test and found
that “[i]f a document purporting to be a tax return serves no purpose at all
under the Internal Revenue Code, such a document cannot, as a matter of law,
qualify as an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the
tax law.”102 This opinion is interesting, however, in that the court first raised a
hypothetical situation where a debtor’s post-assessment filing could possibly
comply with the Beard test, before declaring that it would “save resolution of
that hypothetical case for another day.”103 The court’s hypothetical involved a
situation where a debtor’s form filed post-assessment actually showed an
increase in the debtor’s liability when compared to the IRS’s assessment
92

In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034.
In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1058.
94 United States v. Hatton (In re Hatton), 220 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000).
95 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1057; In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 906; In re Hatton, 220 F.3d at 1061; In
re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1029.
96 In re Moroney, 352 F.3d at 905; see In re Payne, 431 F.3d at 1057; In re Hatton, 220 F.3d at 1061; In
re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1035.
97 In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1035.
98 See id. at 1031.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 Id. at 1035.
103 Id. at 1035 n.7.
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estimates.104 While the court did not fully evaluate the scenario, the debt in this
hypothetical seems to be dischargeable under the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation
because the taxpayer made an honest and reasonable attempt to comply with
the law regarding the additional liability.105 “[W]hether [the debtor’s] eventual
effort had some effect on his tax liability,” therefore, is irrelevant in cases
where the debtor fails to file a return until after the IRS has assessed that
individual’s liability because tax forms were only considered to be a return if
the debtor “made an honest and reasonable effort to comply with the tax
laws.”106
While the Fourth and Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Moroney v. IRS (In re
Moroney) and United States v. Hatton (In re Hatton) did preclude the
possibility of discharging a tax debt in most cases involving post-assessment
tax forms, both the Ninth and Fourth Circuits followed In re Hindenlang and
left open the possibility that a post-assessment filing could qualify as a return
for dischargeability purposes under extenuating circumstances.107 What, if any,
extenuating circumstances would allow for this possibility was never fully
analyzed prior to the passage of BAPCPA.
II. THE ONE-DAY-LATE RULE: AN OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT CIRCUIT COURT
DECISIONS FOLLOWING BAPCPA
Following the 2005 BAPCPA amendments, a split developed among the
circuit courts as to the proper interpretation of the hanging paragraph. While
the Fifth, Tenth, and First Circuits held that a tax form filed after April 15th
cannot qualify as a return for dischargeability purposes, the Ninth Circuit
recently held that the pre-BAPCPA Beard test was still the correct method for
determining whether a late-filed tax form qualifies as a return.108
104

See id. at 1034 n.5.
Id.
106 In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 2003).
107 See id. at 907 (“Circumstances not presented in this case might demonstrate that the debtor, despite his
delinquency, had attempted in good faith to comply with the laws.”); In re Hatton, 220 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2000).
108 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014)
(finding it was not necessary to resolve whether a post-assessment Form 1040 could be an honest and
reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law for purposes of the Beard test because under
§ 523(a) a “return” had to comply with applicable filing requirements); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 932 (5th
Cir. 2012) (“[A] state income tax return that is filed late under the applicable nonbankruptcy state law is not a
‘return’ for bankruptcy discharge purposes under § 523(a).”). But see In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2016) (determining that “Hatton applies to the bankruptcy code as amended, and that [the debtor’s] tax
105
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While Congress intended for the BAPCPA amendments to clarify certain
inconsistencies in the Code, courts have split on the proper interpretation of the
hanging paragraph, and the assessment issue has not been fully resolved.109 The
First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits follow the one-day-late rule, holding that filing
deadlines are part of the “applicable filing requirements” that Congress
mentions in the hanging paragraph.110 Proponents of the one-day-late rule,
which the Fifth Circuit first discussed in In re McCoy, maintain that a tax form
filed even one day late is not a return, and any debt arising from a late form is
not dischargeable in bankruptcy.111 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit,112
bankruptcy courts,113 the IRS,114 and dicta by the Eighth Circuit115 have rejected
the one-day-late rule and presented alternative interpretations of the hanging
paragraph.
A. In re McCoy: The First Appearance of the One-Day-Late Interpretation
In In re McCoy, the Fifth Circuit held that late-filed tax forms are not
returns unless the form was filed with the assistance of the IRS under

filing, made seven years late and three years after the IRS assessed a deficiency against him, was not an
‘honest and reasonable’ attempt to comply with the tax code”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016)
(No. 16-497).
109 Compare In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (“[A] state income tax return that is filed late under the
applicable nonbankruptcy state law is not a ‘return’ for bankruptcy discharge purposes under § 523(a).”), with
In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097 (determining that “Hatton applies to the bankruptcy code as amended, and that
[the debtor’s] tax filing, made seven years late and three years after the IRS assessed a deficiency against him,
was not an ‘honest and reasonable’ attempt to comply with the tax code”). See generally Stephen J. Csontos,
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Impact on Federal Taxes, 54 U.S.
ATTY’S BULL., no. 4, July 2006, at 16.
110 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 10; In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1325; In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932.
111 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 932 (holding that the debtor’s failure to file in the time required under
Mississippi’s tax law was a failure to satisfy the applicable nonbankruptcy law § 523(a), meaning the debtor’s
late-filed returns could not be considered tax returns for bankruptcy discharge purposes under the plain
language of the statute).
112 See In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1096.
113 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); In re McBride, 534 B.R. 326, 336 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2015); Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R.
479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013).
114 See I.R.S. Notice CC-2010-016 (Sept. 2, 2010) (stating that a late-filed tax debt can be discharged);
I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advice No. 201044008 (Nov. 5, 2010).
115 In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006). Although the court did not rely directly on the
BAPCPA language because the debtor filed his petition prior to the act’s effective date, the Court agreed with
Judge Easterbrook’s dissent in In re Payne and stated, “[w]e have been offered no persuasive reason to create a
more subjective definition of “return” that is dependent on the facts and circumstances of a taxpayer’s filing.”
Id.
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§ 6020(a).116 In re McCoy involved a debtor, who was granted a chapter 7
discharge in early 2008, suing the Mississippi State Tax Commission. This
debtor sought to have the court declare that the debtor’s pre-petition debt
arising from late-filed state tax forms was discharged when her chapter 7
discharge was granted.117 The court interpreted the hanging paragraph to mean
that the Mississippi Tax Code is an “applicable filing requirement” for
determining the dischargeability of a tax debt.118 The practical result is that
April 15th, which is mentioned in the Mississippi Tax Code, is the deadline by
which a tax return must be filed. Thus, the one-day-late rule stems from the
Fifth Circuit’s understanding that Congress clearly and unambiguously
intended for the phrase “applicable non-bankruptcy law (including applicable
filing requirements)” in the hanging paragraph to include the date on which a
tax form is filed.
While the consequence of In re McCoy is that debt resulting from a latefiled tax form is basically nondischargeable, the court maintained that the oneday-late rule is consistent “with the [Beard] test’s emphasis ‘that where a
fiduciary, in good faith, makes what it deems the appropriate return, which
discloses all of the data from which the tax . . . can be computed,’ a proper
return has been filed.”119 The Fifth Circuit did not clarify, however, how the
one-day-late rule can be consistent with the Beard test when a tax form filed in
a jurisdiction following the Beard test is valid in situations where the debtor
filed the form in good faith and provided all the information necessary to
assess the tax.120 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit claimed that the House Report
discussing BAPCPA, which mentioned a desire to close loopholes in the Code,
provided support for the one-day-late interpretation.121 The legislative history,
however, does not appear to support the Fifth Circuit’s position, and the oneday-late rule actually creates a new loophole in the Code.122

116

See In re McCoy, 666 F.at 932.
See id. at 925.
118 Id. at 928 (discussing MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-41, which states that taxes should be filed either by
April 15th or the 15th day of the fourth month of the year).
119 Id. at 931 (citing In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1033 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted)).
120 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012).
121 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931 (“BAPCPA was passed, in part, to address the problem of the
‘bankruptcy system hav[ing] loopholes and incentives that allow–and–sometimes even encourage
opportunistic personal filings and abuse.’”).
122 See discussion infra Section II.C.
117

SAHAROVICH GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

12/15/2016 3:13 PM

TO DISCHARGE OR NOT TO DISCHARGE

237

B. IRS Opposition to the One-Day-Late Rule and the Tenth Circuit’s
Response
In 2010, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel released a Notice that addressed
the topic of dischargeability that stated: “A form 1040 is not disqualified as a
‘return’ under section 523(a) solely because it was filed late.”123 The IRS
reasoned that a debt does not actually arise until an individual has failed to file
a return, and the IRS has filed an assessment.124 This simple-to-apply
viewpoint would allow for the discharge of debt resulting from late-filed tax
forms in cases where a debtor filed his or her own tax forms prior to the IRS
assessing the debtor’s liability. The IRS contended that Congress did not
intend for its definition of “return” to include a strict temporal element.125
After the Fifth Circuit established the one-day-late rule in In re McCoy, the
Tenth Circuit’s 2014 In re Mallo decision directly addressed the IRS’s
position.126 In In re Mallo, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the IRS’s position and
maintained that the assessment process is irrelevant for determining whether a
debt arising from a late-filed return is dischargeable because, “if Congress
wished to make the process relevant to discharge of tax debts, it could have
easily done so.”127 Although courts are bound by statutory language and the
role of a judge is not to legislate, the Tenth Circuit’s entire interpretation is
built on reading into § 523(a) a temporal element that Congress never
discussed in its amendments.128 Numerous bankruptcy courts have properly
rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the hanging paragraph, and this
disagreement will be discussed further in the analysis below.129
C. Judge Thompson’s In re Fahey Dissent
The next major discussion regarding the hanging paragraph appeared in the
First Circuit’s 2015 decision, Fahey v. Massachusetts Department of Revenue
(In re Fahey).130 While the majority in In re Fahey did little more than agree

123

I.R.S. Notice, supra note 114.
Id.
125 Id.
126 774 F.3d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 2014).
127 Id.
128 See id. at 1321–22.
129 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 521 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (“Congress could have easily excluded a
late return, but it did not do so. In fact, there is no temporal element in the definition.”).
130 779 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2015).
124
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with the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, Judge Thompson’s dissent addressed issues
regarding the one-day-late rule that may alter the course of future discussions
on this topic.131 In re Fahey involved a debt resulting from a state tax, and the
First Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit in In re McCoy, held that a tax document
filed after April 15th cannot be a valid tax return.132 The majority found that:
[I]t is more plausible that Congress intended to settle the dispute over
late-filed tax returns against the debtor (who both fails to pay taxes
and fails to file a return as required by law) than it is that Congress
sought to settle some version of the unsettled four-pronged Beard
test.133

The First Circuit therefore agreed with the Fifth Circuit and held that a tax
form filed one day late can never qualify as a return unless it was filed with the
assistance of the IRS under § 6020(a).
Judge Thompson dissented, detailing his issues with both the harsh effect
that the one-day-late interpretation has on debtors, and the fact that the
majority ignored the surrounding language of the statute to reach its
conclusion. Judge Thompson maintained that the one-day-late rule leads to an
absurd result because the rule punishes many law-abiding, honest individuals
regardless of the individual’s reason for filing late.134 Judge Thompson thought
that filing a tax form late should not automatically make debt stemming from
that form non-dischargeable because, “[i]f the statute’s language is plain, the
sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its terms. In so
doing, however, we only apply plain meaning if the statutory language is not
ambiguous and would not ‘lead to absurd results.’”135
Under the First Circuit’s one-day-late analysis, he argued, the disposition
required by the text would be absurd because individuals who are attempting to
provide the IRS with relevant, valuable information regarding tax liability are
being punished regardless of the reason for the late filing.136 While the majority

131

See id. at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 10.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 11 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s holding] simultaneously takes too academic
and literal of an approach to its reading of one of the code’s definitional provisions, leading to a result that
defies common sense, while also conveniently ignoring the plain meaning of other words in the very same
paragraph, in order to reach a certain outcome.”).
135 Id. (quoting Morse v. Rudler (In re Rudler), 576 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2009)).
136 Id. at 19.
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claimed to rely on the “plain meaning” of the statute, Judge Thompson pointed
out that in enforcing statutes according to their plain meaning, “we only apply
plain meaning if the statutory language is not ambiguous and would not lead to
absurd results.”137
In addition to the absurdity of punishing every individual who files a tax
form one day late regardless of the reason for filing late, Judge Thompson
explained that the majority’s interpretation requiring complete, perfect
compliance with all the applicable filing requirements will only lead to more
illogical results in situations—situations where it is unlikely Congress intended
to preclude the possibility of a discharge.138 These illogical results are
impossible to avoid under the strict one-day-late interpretation because any
individual who has failed to comply with every specific filing requirement will
be barred from the possibility of receiving a discharge on a tax debt.
Additionally, Judge Thompson questioned why Congress would choose not
to alter the language of § 523(a)(B)(ii),139 which allows for the discharge of
late-filed taxes as long as those returns were not filed within two years prior to
the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, if Congress intended to eliminate the
possibility of discharging debt stemming from a late-filed return. “As the
debtors appropriately urge, there would be no point in leaving Subsection (ii)
the specific exception that deals with late filers–if Congress meant for the
hanging paragraph to penalize everyone who misses filing deadlines.”140 As a
result, Judge Thompson reasoned, it is not possible to accurately ascertain the
plain meaning of one specific phrase within a subsection of a statute without
looking at the surrounding sections of the statute.141 Therefore, the majority’s
interpretation must be incorrect because the majority entirely ignored
§ 523(a)(B)(ii) when it determined that Congress intended for the phrase
“includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a),”142 which appears in

137

Id.
See id. at 11 n.16 (identifying that seemingly irrelevant issues, such as failing to properly staple
documents, would ultimately have to preclude the possibility of a discharge because the document did not
comply with the applicable filing requirements).
139 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(B)(ii) (2012) (“A discharge under § 727 . . . does not discharge an individual from
any debt – for a tax or a customs duty . . . with respect to which a return, or equivalent report or notice, if
required . . . was filed or given after the date on which such return, report, or notice was last due, under
applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of the filing of the petition . . . .”).
140 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 13–14.
142 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*).
138
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the hanging paragraph, to be an exhaustive list of all the types of late-filed
documents that may be considered returns for the purpose of discharge.143
Judge Thompson explained that even by solely looking at the plain meaning,
the logical interpretation of the word “includes” would not create an exhaustive
list.144
Finally, the majority’s interpretation rewards individuals who intentionally
fail to file returns, are caught by the IRS, and agree to file forms with
assistance of the IRS under § 6020(a).145 While these individuals are still
eligible for a discharge of this debt, a debtor who unintentionally missed the
filing deadline and filed his own taxes one day late will never be able to
receive a discharge.146 As a result, the majority’s interpretation appears to
create a system that leaves open a loophole for individuals to exploit the
bankruptcy discharge system. Judge Thompson’s dissent succinctly raises the
flaws in the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations of the hanging
paragraph, and his arguments will be further analyzed below.
D. The Ninth Circuit Declines to Adopt the One-Day-Late Rule
Unlike the circuits following the one-day-late rule, the Ninth Circuit, in IRS
v. Smith (In re Smith), affirmed a district court’s decision to apply the Beard
test as opposed to the one-day-late rule.147 Although the Ninth Circuit did not
directly address the one-day-late late rule, the decision to continue using the
Beard test as it had been applied prior to 2005 necessarily implies that the oneday-late rule cannot be the correct interpretation of the BAPCPA amendments.
As a result, a split now exists among the circuit courts following the Ninth
Circuit’s holding.
In In re Smith, the District Court for the Northern District of California
originally held that a late-filed form could be a return as long as the statutory
requirements are satisfied, and the court has made a determination that the filer
satisfied the Beard test.148 The court reached this conclusion after finding that
143

In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 14 (“If Congress intended the outcome espoused by the majority, it would have used different
language (e.g., ‘is limited to’)—not the word includes.”).
145 Id. at 18.
146 Id. at 13.
147 828 F.3d 1094, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016).
148 Smith v. IRS (In re Smith), 527 B.R. 14, 23 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 828 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2016),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) (No. 16-497).
144
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the Beard test requires courts to analyze all of the facts surrounding the late
filing when determining whether a late-filed form qualifies as a return.149 As a
result, the In re Smith decision mirrors the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel’s holding in Martin II, which is discussed in the following section. In
affirming the district court’s opinion, the Ninth Circuit undertook a subjective
investigation of the facts surrounding the debtor’s late filing and held that the
debtor’s tax forms were not a return because they were filed years after the IRS
had already assessed the debtor’s taxes.150 Notably, the court also chose not to
answer whether a tax return filed after an IRS assessment can ever be a return;
thus, the post-assessment dispute has not been resolved.151
III. BANKRUPTCY COURTS OPPOSING THE ONE-DAY-LATE RULE
In addition to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in In re Smith, bankruptcy
courts declining to follow the one-day-late rule have provided alternative
interpretations of § 523(a) that appear to create an effective system that
balances Congress’s interest in passing the BAPCPA amendments with the
general interests of American bankruptcy law. While the First, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits all reached the same conclusion—that debt resulting from a late-filed
tax form is never dischargeable—numerous bankruptcy courts, academic
papers, the Ninth Circuit, and the IRS152 have expressed their displeasure with
the one-day-late interpretation of the hanging paragraph. These bankruptcy
courts and the IRS maintain that a debt resulting from a late-filed return is
dischargeable if the debtor satisfies the various pre-BAPCPA requirements for
a discharge.153
Although the post-assessment issue was not relevant in In re Maitland
because the IRS had not yet assessed a penalty against the debtor at the time
when the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition, numerous courts declining to
149

See infra Section III.A.
See In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097.
151 See id. (“We need not decide the close question of whether any post-assessment filing could be ‘honest
and reasonable’ because these are not close facts; the IRS communicated with Smith for years before assessing
a deficiency, and Smith waited several more years before responding to the IRS or reporting his 2001 financial
information.”).
152 See supra Section II.B; see also In re Smith, 828 F.3d at 1097.
153 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015); Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 726 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. 357, 370
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2013) (“The Court concludes that § 523(a)(*)’s requirement that a return satisfy ‘applicable
bankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements)’ does not include a timeliness requirement and,
therefore, does not exclude the Debtor’s late-filed post-assessment returns.”).
150
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follow the In re McCoy logic have held that an IRS assessment does not
inherently preclude a discharge as long as the debtor has satisfied all of the
Beard and statutory requirements.154
Although all courts declining to follow the one-day-late rule maintain that a
late-filed tax return can be valid as long as the Beard test is satisfied, a split
does exist among the courts that oppose the one-day-late rule. While some
courts maintain that the fourth prong of the Beard test involves only looking at
whether an individual has filed a tax form that is of use to the IRS,155 other
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that the fourth prong of the
Beard test involves looking at all relevant factors, including when the form
was filed, why it was filed late, and whether it was useful to the IRS.156
Courts opposing the one-day-late rule are largely concerned with three
major issues: (1) the harsh result of the one-day-late interpretation; (2) the
inconsistency between the one-day-late interpretation and the surrounding
language of § 523; and (3) a lack of legislative history supporting the notion
that Congress intended to displace the Beard test.157 The center of the argument
opposing the one-day-late rule is that the Fifth Circuit’s “draconian
interpretation” of the hanging paragraph “is inconsistent with the oft-stated
policy of the Code that its principal purpose is to grant a fresh start to the
‘honest, but unfortunate debtor.’”158 Given that a majority of courts allowed for
the dischargeability of debts arising from late-filed tax forms prior to
BAPCPA, courts opposing the one-day-late rule have used this policy
argument, coupled with a lack of legislative history supporting the one-day-late
rule, as a basis for the idea that Congress did not intend to exclude late-filed
tax forms from being returns.159

154 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 480, 492 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015); In re Briggs, 511 B.R. 707, 718 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2014); In re Rhodes, 498 B.R. at 370.
155 See In re Davis, No. 14-26507 (CMG), 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3331, at *14 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 29,
2015).
156 See Martin II, 542 B.R. at 492; In re Smith, 527 B.R. 14, 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 828 F.3d 1094
(9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 13, 2016) (No. 16-497).
157 See, e.g., Martin II, 542 B.R. at 479–80, 489–90; In re Davis, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3331, at *13.
158 In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 521; see also Martin I, 508 B.R. at 726–27; In re Briggs, 511 B.R. at 714–
16.
159 See Brown v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Brown), 489 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013), aff’d sub
nom. In re Gonzalez, 506 B.R. 317 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2015), and aff’d, No. ADV 11-04150-MSH, 2014 WL 1815393 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Apr. 3, 2014), and rev’d sub
nom. In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
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The one-day-late rule is grounded in the idea that, because “the applicable
filing requirements include filing deadlines, § 523(a)(*) plainly excludes latefiled Form 1040s from the definition of a return.”160 While the In re McCoy
plain-language interpretation is an easy-to-apply rule, courts opposing the oneday-late rule worry that “the one-day-late interpretation of the hanging
paragraph yields a potentially absurd result.”161 As a result, recent bankruptcy
court decisions have adopted and expanded on Judge Thompson’s dissent in In
re Fahey.162 Bankruptcy courts opposing the one-day-late rule explain that
relevant nonbankruptcy law does not support the notion that a tax form filed
after the deadline can never qualify as a return. As the Bankruptcy Court for
the Eastern District of California found in United States v. Martin (In re
Martin) (“Martin I”), provisions of the Internal Revenue Code support this
proposition:
The only temporal consideration that this court could locate in the tax
law is the April 15 filing deadline under IRC § 6072(a). However,
unlike other requirements imposed by applicable tax law, a
taxpayer’s failure to timely file a return by this statutory deadline
does not defeat the purpose of the return or render it a nullity; the late
filing is simply grounds to impose additional penalties and interest on
the taxpayer. A return filed on April 16 is still accepted as a return by
the IRS.163

If courts look to the Beard test when interpreting the applicable nonbankruptcy
law discussed in § 523(a), courts opposing the one-day-late rule suggest that
the policy behind bankruptcy could be satisfied, and the harsh result of the
one-day-late rule could be avoided.164

160

In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2014).
Martin I, 508 B.R. at 729.
162 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. at 519–20 (“[Judge Thompson] criticized the [In re Fahey] majority for
being ‘unfairly dismissive of the debtor’s logical interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue.’ This court
agrees that the majority’s result in Fahey ‘defies common sense.’”) (quoting In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 11 (1st
Cir. 2015) (Thompson, J., dissenting)).
163 Martin I, 508 B.R. at 732 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
164 See, e.g., Pendergast v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (In re Pendergast), 494 B.R. 8, 14 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 510 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 14-9004,
2015 WL 3388354 (1st Cir. May 1, 2015) (noting the “unsavory” result of this interpretation).
161
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A. The Split: Is a Court Determination Always Required to Determine If a
Late-Filed Form Is a Return?
Recently, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit vacated the
Martin I decision on the grounds that it was too narrow, concluding that the
more expansive pre-BAPCPA minority approach for the Beard test165 must be
applied when evaluating if a late-filed tax form is a return.166 While the
Bankruptcy Court in Martin I originally held that a late-filed tax form is a
return whenever the form is objectively useful to the IRS, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel vacated this ruling in Martin II and held that the fourth
element of the Beard test must involve an actual determination by the court as
to whether an individual has made an honest and reasonable attempt to comply
with the tax law.167
Although the court in both Martin I and Martin II maintained that a latefiled tax form can qualify as a return, the Martin II court argued that courts
must always evaluate all relevant factors, including the “number of missing
returns, the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and any other
circumstances reasonably pertaining to the honesty and reasonableness of the
[debtors’] efforts.”168 Thus, an individual’s failure to file his or her tax forms
until after an IRS assessment does not preclude a discharge when the court
finds that the individual actually filed his or her own tax form and has
complied with the Beard test. The Martin II holding stands for the idea that the
fourth prong of the Beard test requires a determination by the court based on
all the relevant facts whenever the test is applied.169 Therefore, the Martin II
holding mirrors the recent Ninth Circuit opinion on the issue, In re Smith.170
165 See In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he honesty and genuineness of the filer’s
attempt to satisfy the tax law should be determined from the face of the form itself, not from the filer’s
delinquency or the reasons for it.”).
166 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 492 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
167 See id. at 491.
168 Id.
169 See id. (“[W]e furthermore believe that the determination of whether all of the relevant facts and
circumstances constitute an honest and reasonable effort to comply with the applicable tax laws is best made,
in the first instance, by the bankruptcy court.”).
170 Compare In re Smith, 828 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Here, Smith failed to make a tax filing
until seven years after his return was due and three years after the IRS went to the trouble of calculating a
deficiency and issuing an assessment. Under these circumstances, Smith’s ‘belated acceptance of
responsibility’ was not a reasonable attempt to comply with the tax code.”), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct.
13, 2016) (No. 16-497), with Martin II, 542 B.R. at 491 (“[W]e furthermore believe that the determination of
whether all of the relevant facts and circumstances constitute an honest and reasonable effort to comply with
the applicable tax laws is best made, in the first instance, by the bankruptcy court.”).
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Importantly, both the court in Martin I and the court in Martin II support
the notion that Congress did not intend for the hanging paragraph to impose a
strict temporal deadline in the definition of “return.” Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit’s finding that the Martin II reasoning was correct has led to further
confusion as to what exactly Congress intended with the BAPCPA
amendments. Ultimately, this issue needs to be resolved to determine whether
the Martin I interpretation, the Martin II/In re Smith interpretation, the oneday-late rule, or some alternate interpretation of the hanging paragraph is the
correct interpretation that Congress intended when it passed the BAPCPA
amendments.
B. The Future of the Discussion Regarding the One-Day-Late Rule
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Smith created a split among the circuit
courts that has yet to be resolved. While the Fifth Circuit’s logic supporting the
one-day-late rule was popular among courts immediately following the passage
of the BAPCPA amendments, recent court opinions appear to be shifting away
from the hardline rule in favor of the more flexible Beard test.171 This shift is
sensible, given the fact the one-day-late interpretation does not fully account
for the problems that Congress sought to resolve in passing the BAPCPA
amendments.
Additionally, courts opposing the one-day-late rule note that the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation in In re McCoy is unfounded when considering not only
the harsh practical effect of the rule, but also the fact that the one-day-late rule
is a large departure from the way in which the majority of courts treated latefiled tax documents prior to the BAPCPA amendments.172 Various courts and
scholars have raised both plain language and statutory construction
arguments;173 the remainder of this Comment will analyze the flaws of the oneday-late interpretation in light of these criticisms.

171 See, e.g., Justice v. United States (In re Justice), 817 F.3d 738, 743 (11th Cir. 2016); In re Smith, 828
F.3d at 1096–97.
172 Martin I, 508 B.R. 717, 726–27 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 542 B.R. 479
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015) (identifying other courts and the IRS as critics of the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation).
173 See, e.g., Martin II, 542 B.R. at 492; Morgan D. King, Tolstoy, Discharging Taxes, and the Fifth
Circuit, 4 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Apr. 2012, Westlaw, 2012 No. 4 Norton Bankr. L. Adviser 3.
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ANALYSIS
I. PLAIN MEANING ANALYSIS
The hanging paragraph is ambiguous because the plain language of the
statute does not provide definitive support for either the one-day-late rule or
alternative interpretations of the hanging paragraph.174 Courts following the
one-day-late interpretation ignore this ambiguity while seeking to achieve a
specific result. While proponents of the one-day-late rule base their view on
the notion that “the plain language meaning of the [Bankruptcy] Code should
rarely be trumped,”175 the one-day-late rule approach fails to resolve two major
issues related to the plain meaning of the statute. First, the hanging paragraph
requires individuals to comply with “applicable filing requirements,”176 and
courts following the one-day-late rule fail to explain how the strict one-daylate rule could apply to trivial filing requirements. Second, the language
surrounding the hanging paragraph cannot be ignored when interpreting the
phrase “applicable filing requirements.”
In conducting its plain language analysis, the Fifth Circuit in In re McCoy
concluded, “[the debtor’s] failure to file in the time required under
Mississippi’s tax law is a failure to satisfy the applicable nonbankruptcy law
referenced in § 523(a).”177 To support this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied
on the notion that “[although] the Code at times is ‘awkward and even
ungrammatical . . . that does not make it ambiguous.’”178 This interpretation
fails to answer either of the aforementioned concerns and leaves two important
questions unanswered: First, is the phrase “applicable filing requirements”
more ambiguous than the proponents of the one-day-late interpretation
suggest? Second, do the proponents of the one-day-late interpretation ignore
this ambiguity in favor of reaching a desired conclusion?
In general, courts do not offer their own interpretation of a statute unless
the language of that statute is vague or ambiguous.179 The one-day-late
174

See supra text accompanying notes 16–43.
See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting DaimlerChrysler
Fin. Servs. Ams. LLC v. Miller (In re Miller), 570 F.3d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 2009)).
176 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘return’ means a return
that satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable filing requirements.”)).
177 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 928.
178 See id. at 929 (citation omitted).
179 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).
175
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interpretation, therefore, would be a correct interpretation of the hanging
paragraph if the language of the hanging paragraph were clear and
unambiguous. The language of the hanging paragraph, however, is vague, and
additional tools of interpretation are necessary to properly apply the statute as
Congress intended. Ultimately, the courts following the one-day-late rule
“gloss over one of the most important rules of plain meaning statutory
construction: that the meaning of a statutory term is only considered plain and
unambiguous if the term is clearly understood in the context of the words
surrounding it and in the context of the larger statutory scheme.”180
A. The Phrase “Applicable Filing Requirements” Is Ambiguous
In the First Circuit case In re Fahey, the court provided an effective
hypothetical example where the one-day-late rule would be difficult to
uniformly apply.181 As the First Circuit noted, “Perhaps the term ‘applicable
filing requirements’ may acquire vagueness at the outer boundaries of its
possible application.”182 In defining “vagueness,” the First Circuit relied on
Justice Scalia’s explanation that vagueness exists where a phrase’s
“unquestionable meaning has uncertain application to various factual
situations.”183 The First Circuit’s hypothetical involved an improperly stapled
tax form, which appears to serve as the court’s example for where the term
“applicable filing requirements” might be vague. Unfortunately, the court
decided not to deal with this issue and declined to address whether an
individual failing to properly staple his tax forms would constitute a failure to
satisfy applicable filing requirements.184 By choosing not to fully analyze this
issue, the court ignored the complexities involved in interpreting the vagueness
of the hanging paragraph in favor of adopting the bright line one-day-late
rule.185
In In re Mallo, the Tenth Circuit considered the dictionary definitions of
the individual terms “applicable,” “filing,” and “requirement” before
180

Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 486 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
779 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2015) (“For example, is an instruction on an official form that the filer not
staple the return together, or staple the check to the return, an ‘applicable filing requirement’?”).
182 Id.
183 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 31–32
(2012).
184 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 5.
185 Id. (“Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Congress’s chosen test called for satisfying the filing
requirements of applicable law, not merely making an ‘honest attempt’ to do so.”).
181
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concluding that “the plain language of the phrase [‘applicable filing
requirement’] means something that must be done with respect to filing a tax
return.”186 This definition is offered by the court to support the idea that a
debtor’s failure to satisfy any and all applicable nonbankruptcy legal
requirements related to filing a tax return precludes that debtor’s tax forms
from being a valid return for dischargeability purposes. The Tenth Circuit’s
approach does little, if anything, to address situations where it is unclear how
the court would apply the one-day-late rule, such as when the debtor fails to
properly staple a tax form.
The plain language analysis conducted by the First and Tenth Circuits has
led proponents of the one-day-late rule to prematurely conclude that “any type
of return not filed in accord with applicable filing requirements is not a ‘return’
under our reading of the statute.”187 No circuit court has addressed the
uncertainty surrounding the phrase “applicable filing requirements” or
explained how exactly the one-day-late rule would apply in a situation where
an individual has failed to comply with a trivial filing requirement. If a latefiled form is not a return because the filer has failed to comply with applicable
filing requirements, it would seem to follow that an individual who mistakenly
fills out part of his tax form incorrectly has also not filed a valid return for the
same reason.188
Unless Congress desired to create a system requiring perfection when filing
a tax form, the strict one-day-late interpretation of the phrase “applicable filing
requirements” is problematic when it is applied to requirements other than the
date of filing. The hanging paragraph is therefore ambiguous because the oneday-late interpretation cannot be uniformly applied to situations involving
other trivial “filing requirements.” Given this ambiguity, courts must consult
additional tools of statutory interpretation beyond the plain meaning of the
statute to interpret the hanging paragraph properly.

186

774 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2014).
In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 6.
188 See Jay Hancock, After 94 Years, Filing Taxes Still a Process of Trivial Tyranny, BALT. SUN (Apr. 15,
2007), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007-04-15/business/0704150161_1_earned-income-credit-qualifyingchild-eic (“There are 77 boxes to complete on [2007]’s Form 1040, each a trap door of potential perjury and
fraud prosecution.”).
187
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B. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Ignores the Language Surrounding the
Phrase “Applicable Filing Requirements”
Under the one-day-late interpretation, the only types of late-filed tax forms
that can ever qualify as “returns” are § 6020(a) forms189 because § 6020(a)
forms are the only types of acceptable late-filed tax forms that Congress
explicitly mentions in the hanging paragraph.190 The courts following the oneday-late rule suggest that Congress intended for § 6020(a) to be a narrow
exception to the general rule that a late-filed tax form is not a return.191 If,
however, Congress considered § 6020(a) forms to be valid returns for
dischargeability purposes, it is unclear why other late-filed forms could not
also be valid if the individual filing the forms provided the IRS with necessary
information.
In contrast, a plain language reading suggests that Congress intended for
the language regarding § 6020(a) to be one example of a type of late-filed form
that can still be a “return,” as opposed to the sole example. This point is
evidenced by the fact that Congress chose to use the term “includes” as
opposed to a term that would more clearly express that § 6020(a) is the only
acceptable late-filed return.192 Congress’s decision to use “includes” in the final
draft of the hanging paragraph, as opposed to a limiting term such as “only” or
“is limited to,” must be viewed as an intentional decision and cannot be
ignored. Congress’s choice not to explicitly clarify whether a § 6020(a) form is
the only example of a late-filed form that can be a return for dischargeability
purposes is one example of an ambiguity present in the hanging paragraph
because the plain language of the statute does not provide definitive support
for either the one-day-late interpretation or an opposing view.
Further, the specific language regarding § 6020(b) forms193 would be
irrelevant if the one-day-late interpretation is correct in concluding that
§ 6020(a) forms are the only acceptable type of late-filed returns. There would
189 Section 6020(a) forms are late-filed tax forms drafted by the IRS and confirmed by the individual filer.
26 U.S.C. § 6020(a) (2012). Section 6020(b) forms are late-filed tax forms filed by the IRS on behalf of an
individual with no confirmation or signature from the individual filer. Id. § 6020(b)(1).
190 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012) (“Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a
final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 . . . .”).
191 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 928–29 (5th Cir. 2012).
192 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (“Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) . . . .”).
193 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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be no reason for Congress to specifically discuss § 6020(b) forms because a
§ 6020(b) form can only be filed after the original filing deadline.
Interestingly, the majority in In re Fahey admitted that the one-day-late
interpretation does render the language regarding § 6020(b) superfluous before
claiming that “[w]hatever one thinks of this redundancy, it offers too little to
parry the force of the observation that a requirement to file on time is a filing
requirement.”194 Ignoring this “redundancy” results in an overly simplified
interpretation that does not fully reflect the language that Congress chose to
use in the statute.
Courts following the one-day-late interpretation also have failed to address
the issue that if a § 6020(a) form is the only type of return that is accepted after
the filing deadline, then it logically must follow that a § 6020(b) form would
be the only type of return that would not be accepted.195 This failure to evaluate
the entire statute constitutes a “fail[ure] to substantively address why the
absurd conclusion we must draw from [the one-day-late rule] reading of the
statute does not require consideration of what Congress actually meant when it
added the § 6020 language to the statute.”196 The debate among courts over the
meaning of this clause suggests that there is an ambiguity in the statute and
that courts should consult other relevant tools of interpretation to determine
what Congress intended to do when it passed the BAPCPA amendments.
Finally, Congress used the term “return” to describe § 6020(b) forms in the
hanging paragraph.197 Congress must have therefore considered § 6020(b)
forms to be returns and likely sought to use the hanging paragraph as a vehicle
for explaining that debt stemming from these returns is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. A § 6020(b) return is one in which the IRS prepares the return
without any assistance from the individual.198 The difference between
§ 6020(a) and § 6020(b) returns is that an individual agrees to cooperate with
the IRS and sign the return under the former.199 As many courts have noted,
Congress likely intended to reward individuals who comply with the IRS and
194

In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931).
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (“Such term includes a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or similar State or local law, or a written stipulation to a judgment or a final
order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal, but does not include a return made pursuant to section 6020(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 . . . .”); In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7.
196 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 15 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*).
198 See 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b) (2012).
199 See id. § 6020(a)–(b).
195
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punish those who do not.200 The validity of a § 6020(a) or § 6020(b) return
never hinges on the date that the return is filed because both forms are always
filed after the filing deadline. Under this alternative interpretation, late-filed
forms in which the individual provides relevant tax information to the IRS,
such as § 6020(a) forms, would be valid returns as long as the Beard test and
any other relevant statutory provisions (i.e., the two-year rule) are satisfied.
Late-filed forms, in which the individual either provided no information or
false information, would never be returns for dischargeability purposes.
This interpretation would also not run afoul of the majority’s worry in In re
Fahey that “we would be left without any textual basis for distinguishing those
filing requirements that count from those that do not.”201 Those “applicable
filing requirements” would include requirements involving situations where an
individual has not filed a return (like § 6020(b)) or situations where an
individual has done something to impede the IRS from calculating his taxes
(like intentionally providing false information on a late-filed 1040 form).
Further analysis beyond the plain language of the statute is therefore
necessary because of ambiguities in the language of the hanging paragraph and
the discrepancies with regards to the surrounding language of the statute. The
courts following the one-day-late rule rely solely on the plain language of the
statute and “gloss over one of the most important rules of plain meaning
statutory construction: that the meaning of a statutory term is only considered
plain and unambiguous if the term is clearly understood in the context of the
words surrounding it and in the context of the larger statutory scheme.”202 The
phrase “applicable filing requirements” in the hanging paragraph is ambiguous
because it must be considered in the context of the language surrounding the
phrase. “The clarity of statutory language only can be measured in ‘the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as
a whole.’”203 The ambiguities in the statute cause the one-day-late
interpretation to be an incomplete exercise in statutory interpretation, and it is

200

See, e.g., In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012).
779 F.3d at 7.
202 Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 486 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
203 Id. (quoting Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))).
201
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necessary to evaluate the statute in light of Congress’s intent and the relevant
canons of statutory interpretation.204
II. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND FOR BAPCPA TO DISPLACE THE BEARD TEST
Although courts following the one-day-late rule do not see the rule as a
departure from pre-BAPCPA practices,205 the practical outcome of this rule has
altered the dischargeability of tax debt resulting from late-filed forms in a
major way. The real issues with the one-day-late interpretation are twofold.
First, Congress never mentioned a desire to replace the Beard test. Second, the
one-day-late interpretation creates a new loophole in the Code. At its most
basic, the one-day-late interpretation runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s notion
that “[p]re-BAPCPA bankruptcy practice is telling because ‘we will not read
the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear
indication that Congress intended such a departure.’”206 Additionally, “[the]
Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code,
however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect
a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some
discussion in the legislative history.”207
The Fifth Circuit stated in In re McCoy that the one-day-late rule “is
consonant with the pre-BAPCPA test’s emphasis ‘that where a fiduciary, in
good faith, makes what it deems the appropriate return, which discloses all of
the data from which the tax . . . can be computed,’ a proper return has been
filed.”208 The Fifth Circuit failed to explain, however, how the one-day-late
rule could possibly operate in harmony with the Beard test when the rule
explicitly bars individuals who, in good faith, disclose all of the necessary
information regarding their taxes a day late from receiving a discharge. While
the one-day-late approach may be similar to the Beard test in that both provide

204 YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS 3 (2008), http://research.policyarchive.org/19279.pdf.
205 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931 (“We see no ‘major change’ from pre-BAPCPA practices by
reading § 523(a)(*) to generally exclude late state tax returns from the definition of return for bankruptcy
discharge purposes, while differentiating between § 6020(a) and § 6020(b) returns.”).
206 Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007)).
207 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992). See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Hey the Sun is Hot
and the Water’s Fine: Why Not Strip Off That Lien, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13 (2013).
208 In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931.
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interpretations of the term “return,” the result of the In re McCoy temporal
requirement alters the Code in a way that Congress never explicitly intended.209
A. The BAPCPA Legislative History Contains No Clear Indication That
Congress Sought to Impose a Strict Temporal Deadline
Proponents of the one-day-late rule support the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that
Congress intended for BAPCPA to preclude late-filed tax forms from being
returns within the meaning of the Code, in part because these individuals claim
that the BAPCPA legislative history favors this result.210 In contrast, courts and
academics opposing the one-day-late rule maintain the In re McCoy analysis
fails to address the lack of any “clear indication” by Congress to dramatically
alter the pre-BAPCPA Beard test.211 The main issue that courts struggled with
prior to BAPCPA was determining if a tax form filed after an IRS assessment
can be a return.212 This assessment issue is likely what Congress desired to
clarify through its definition of “return.”213 If Congress sought to impose a new
temporal requirement, it could have explicitly stated this desire in either the
BAPCPA text or legislative history. As Judge Thompson explains, “[i]n trying
to discern legislative intent, we look to the historical content of the statute (i.e.
prior case law), the legislative history of the statutory provision, and the policy
underlying the statute.”214
While interpreting the hanging paragraph, courts following the one-day-late
rule focus on the fact that Congress did not include language in the hanging
paragraph that specifically allows for a late-filed tax form to be a return.215
These courts suggest that Congress’s failure to include this specific language
209

See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt.1 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88.
See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 927 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 90–92) (“[The House Report explains] that BAPCPA was motivated by four factors: the
‘recent escalation of consumer bankruptcy filings,’ the ‘significant losses . . . associated with bankruptcy
filings,’ the fact that the ‘bankruptcy system has loopholes that allow and–sometimes–even encourage
opportunistic personal filings and abuse,’ and ‘the fact that some bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a
significant portion of their debts.’”).
211 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 485–86 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
212 See In re Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034 (6th Cir.
1999).
213 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012).
214 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 15 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
215 See In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1325 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Congress could have expressly stated a
document is a return if it ‘satisfies the requirements of applicable nonbankruptcy law (including applicable
substantive filing requirements)’ or ‘(including applicable filing requirements, except the date the filing is
due).’”).
210
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somehow implies that Congress intended to displace the pre-BAPCPA
caselaw. This argument is unsupported by the legislative history and difficult
to accept because prior to BAPCPA, no circuit court ever held that a tax form
was not a return solely because it was filed late.216 Congress did not need to
include explicit language allowing for the dischargeability of this type of debt
because of the long-standing presumption that Congress, when legislating, is
aware of both existing caselaw and the tools of statutory interpretation courts
employ.217 As a result, courts following the one-day-late rule ignore the notion
that “[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write on a
clean slate.”218
B. The BAPCPA Legislative History Does Not Support the Idea that Filing a
Tax Form Late Constitutes an Act of Wrongdoing
The BAPCPA legislative history does not support the Fifth Circuit’s oneday-late interpretation in In re McCoy. The committee report discussing the
BAPCPA amendments only briefly mentions the hanging paragraph.219 This
Report states:
Section 714 of the Act amends section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code to provide that a return prepared pursuant to section 6020(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code, or similar State or local law, constitutes
filing a return (and the debt can be discharged), but that a return filed
on behalf of a taxpayer pursuant to section 6020(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, or similar state or local law, does not constitute filing
a return (and the debt cannot be discharged).220

In addressing this legislative history, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
“Congress, when later drafting § 523(a)(*) to differentiate between § 6020(a)
and § 6020(b) returns, likely wanted to reward taxpayers who cooperated with

216 See In re Payne, 431 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court would not adopt a rule
that a tax form filed after an assessment can never be a return because “[t]here might . . . be circumstances
beyond a taxpayer’s control that prevented him from filing a timely return, or even from asking for an
extension of the time to file, before the tax was assessed”); In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d at 1034 (“The
Bankruptcy Code does permit debtors who have filed late returns to obtain discharges of tax liability in certain
situations.”).
217 See KIM, supra note 204, at 3 (citing McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991)).
218 In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 17 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Dewsnupp v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419
(1992)).
219 H.R. Rep No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 102–03 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 166–67.
220 Id.
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the IRS.”221 The court supported its conclusion by turning to a 1978 Senate
Report discussing the passage of § 523(a), which, in relevant part, states: “[I]n
general, tax claims which are nondischargeable, despite a lack of priority, are
those to whose staleness the debtor contributed by some wrong-doing or
serious fault.”222 The Fifth Circuit failed, however, to mention that the only
example of a nondischargeable tax claim that Congress addressed in the Senate
Report was a situation where an individual files a fraudulent return.223
Although filing a tax form late may lead to monetary penalties,224 the act of
filing a fraudulent return is a serious criminal offense that creates major
problems for the IRS and the individual who filed the false return.225 While the
Fifth Circuit is likely correct in suggesting that Congress wanted to reward
taxpayers who cooperated with the IRS, neither the legislative history nor the
In re McCoy decision explains how filing a tax form one day late constitutes
wrongdoing or serious fault on behalf of the individual filing the forms.
The IRS does not support the notion that such a strict temporal requirement
should be read into the statute.226 The IRS maintains that the pre-BAPCPA
majority approach to the post-assessment issue, which precludes a discharge in
cases where an individual has not filed a return by the time that the IRS
assesses that individual’s liability, is the correct interpretation of the hanging
paragraph.227 Further, the IRS does not suggest that filing a return late
automatically constitutes an act of wrongdoing because they do not even apply
a penalty on late-filed returns where the filer “can show reasonable cause for
not filing or paying on time.”228
Confusingly, the courts following the one-day-late rule suggest that the IRS
interpretation is wrong because “if Congress wished to make the assessment
221

In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
223 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 14 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800 (“In general, tax
claims which are nondischargeable, despite a lack of priority, are those to whose staleness the debtor
contributed by some wrong-doing or serious fault as, for example, taxes with respect to which the debtor filed
a fraudulent return.”).
224 See IRS Tax Tip 2013-58 (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Eight-Facts-on-LateFiling-and-Late-Payment-Penalties (“A failure-to-file penalty may apply if you did not file by the tax filing
deadline.”) (emphasis added).
225 See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2012) (stating that an individual who makes willful fraudulent statements on
a tax return is guilty of a felony).
226 I.R.S. Notice, supra note 114.
227 IRS Tax Tip 2013-58, supra note 224.
228 Id.
222
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process relevant to discharge of tax debts, it could have easily done so.”229
Congress has never mentioned a temporal requirement with regard to
discharging debt resulting from late-filed tax forms and, given that the
legislative history does not allude to this conclusion, it is unlikely that
Congress intended to overhaul the existing caselaw in such a drastic way. If
Congress intended to codify the one-day-late rule, it could have done so in the
text of the statute or documented its intention within the legislative history.
C. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Creates a New Loophole in the Code
More importantly, the one-day-late interpretation appears to be directly at
odds with the BAPCPA legislative history. The House Report from the session
discussing BAPCPA contains language stating that the legislation was passed,
in part, to close “loopholes and incentives that allow and—sometimes—even
encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse.”230 Courts following the
one-day-late rule use this language to argue that allowing individuals to
discharge debt resulting from late-filed tax forms is the incentive that Congress
sought to stop.231 This does not make sense considering that the major issue
regarding dischargeability of tax debt prior to BAPCPA was the issue of postassessment filings.232 The loophole in the hanging paragraph that Congress
likely sought to address was the pre-BAPCPA split where an individual in
certain circuits could simply not file a return until years after the original
deadline and roll the dice on eventually receiving a discharge.233 Presumably,
Congress did not like the idea that the ability to discharge tax debt could hinge
on the randomness of the IRS actually having had the time and resources to
229

See In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 2014).
H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92.
231 See In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012).
232 Compare In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1034–35 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen the debtor has failed to
respond to . . . deficiency letters sent by the IRS, and the government has assessed the deficiency, then . . . the
government thereby has met its burden of showing that the debtor’s actions were not an honest and reasonable
effort to satisfy the tax law.”), with In re Colsen, 446 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2006) (“To be a return, a form is
required to ‘evince’ an honest and genuine attempt to satisfy the laws. This does not require inquiry into the
circumstances under which a document was filed.”).
233 Compare Colsen v. United States (In re Colsen), 311 B.R. 765, 767 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2004) (“By
reading into the statute a requirement that is not in the text, the Hindenlang line of cases would find tax
liabilities nondischargeable regardless of their age and regardless of the debtor’s subjective intent when the tax
returns were filed.”), aff’d, 322 B.R. 118 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 446 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2006), with In re
Moroney, 352 F.3d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Debtors like Moroney cannot seek the safe haven of bankruptcy
by failing to file tax returns, waiting to see if the IRS assesses taxes on its own, and then submitting statements
long after the IRS has been put to its costly proof.”).
230
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assess an individual’s liability prior to that individual filing a bankruptcy
petition.
Ironically, the one-day-late rule creates a new loophole that is similar to the
loophole created by the assessment split. Under the one-day-late interpretation,
struggling taxpayers who are already late on filing taxes have an incentive to
further delay filing their tax forms “with the hope that they would be some of
the lucky few for whom the taxing authorities decide to prepare returns [under
§ 6020(a)] on the taxpayer’s behalf.”234 The one-day-late interpretation
therefore simply trades in one loophole that hinged on the IRS having enough
resources and time to actually assess the liability of every individual who
failed to file a timely return for a new loophole that hinges on the IRS having
enough resources and time to assist individuals in filing under § 6020(a). The
IRS is understaffed and received $1.8 billion dollars less than requested for
2015.235 Very few people are able to file a return under § 6020(a), largely
because the IRS has bigger issues to deal with than helping individual debtors
file late tax forms.236
Congress likely did not intend for BAPCPA to completely eviscerate the
Beard test in favor of a system where honest debtors are prevented from
receiving a discharge largely because the IRS is too busy to assist people in
filing under § 6020(a). The more likely conclusion is that Congress intended
for the hanging paragraph to render the post-assessment issue irrelevant by
codifying the Beard test. The fourth element of the Beard test involves a caseby-case evaluation, and the fact that an individual failed to file until after the
IRS notified that individual of his liability would be one fact the court would
consider when determining if the late-filed form was a return. Under this view,
a discharge will hinge on whether a debtor made an honest and reasonable

234

Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 487 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
See Owen Davis, Tax Season 2015: IRS Cutbacks Cripple Taxpayer Services for Poor, Elderly, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/tax-season-2015-irs-cutbacks-cripple-taxpayerservices-poor-elderly-1871896 (“The number of employees assigned to phones has dropped by 26 percent, and
they answer fewer than four in ten calls. For the lucky few who do connect with a human, wait times are up 70
percent from five years ago, and only the most basic tax questions will be answered.”).
236 See Robert McKenzie, 7 Million Taxpayers Fail to File Their Income Taxes, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014,
2:37 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/irswatch/2014/08/27/7-million-taxpayers-fail-to-file-their-incometaxes/#3870d10045af (“Although the IRS makes efforts to force non-filers into compliance, the continuing
improvident cutting of the IRS budget allows more taxpayers to duck their filing obligations because the IRS
has fewer resources to pursue non-compliant taxpayers.”).
235
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attempt to comply with the tax law as opposed to whether the IRS can get
around to allowing an individual to file under § 6020(a).
III. INTERPRETING THE AMBIGUITIES OF § 523(A)(*)
Although courts following the one-day-late rule have determined that the
phrase “applicable filing requirements” includes the act of late filing, this rule
is so harsh on debtors that it seems implausible that Congress intended for the
hanging paragraph to be construed in such a broad manner.
[F]requently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words
broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of
the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such
broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the
legislator intended to include the particular act.237

The unnecessarily harsh result of the one-day-late interpretation in light of the
entire statute, which includes the language discussing § 6020(a) and § 6020(b),
suggests that further analysis beyond the plain language of the statute is
necessary to actually discern the purpose of the hanging paragraph. It is
therefore necessary to consult relevant tools of statutory construction before it
is possible to ascertain a proper interpretation of the hanging paragraph.
A. Avoidance of Absurdity
The one-day-late interpretation leads to the absurd result whereby an
individual who fails to mail in his or her return until April 16th due to some
unforeseen illness is punished in the same way that an individual who
knowingly files a fraudulent return is punished.238 If the oft-stated policy
behind bankruptcy is to provide a fresh start to the unfortunate debtor, it seems
unlikely that Congress intended for BAPCPA to preclude debtors who have
engaged in no willful wrongdoing from receiving a discharge.

237 Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
238 See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 522 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (“The McCoy reading of the definition of
‘return’ would impose the same penalty for blameless failure to file a timely return, such as a debtor who was
prevented from mailing his return on April 15th because of illness, as would be imposed on a debtor who
committed an intentional tort.”).
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Courts following the one-day-late rule claim that Congress’s decision to
keep the language regarding § 6020(a) tax returns does not render the language
of the hanging paragraph ambiguous because Congress wanted to offer a
method for the IRS to encourage uncooperative individuals to file their tax
returns.239 As the Fifth Circuit suggested in In re McCoy, the reason that
Congress allowed § 6020(a) forms to be returns for the purpose of this statute
was presumably to “reward taxpayers who cooperated with the IRS.”240 The
Fifth Circuit failed to explain, however, how an individual who files accurate
tax forms one day late is not cooperating with the IRS. In fact, no court
following the one-day-late interpretation has provided any explanation
supporting the idea that the hanging paragraph was designed to punish every
individual who filed late while simultaneously rewarding the small number of
people whom the IRS decides to allow to file a § 6020(a) return.241
On a similar note, another confusing result of the one-day-late rule is that
the scofflaw who sits on his hands at tax time, doesn’t bother to file a
return, and then, after getting caught, cooperates with the authorities
and lets the government file the substitute return for him, would be
the only late filer who would be allowed to discharge his tax debt.242

Both the IRS and state taxing authorities have the discretion to accept late-filed
forms without imposing a penalty on the filer.243 Assuming the late filer
actually provides necessary information to the IRS, which is essential to
complying with the fourth prong of the Beard test, it does not make sense to
conclude that the individual has not cooperated with the IRS solely because the
IRS chose not to allow the filer to file the tax forms under § 6020(a).
B. Avoid Rendering Other Provisions in the Act Superfluous
A plain language analysis of § 523(a) should not be restricted solely to the
language of the hanging paragraph.244 Courts following the one-day-late rule

239

See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (Thompson, J., dissenting); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313,
1324 (10th Cir. 2014); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 2012).
240 In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 931.
241 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 15 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 7 (majority opinion). The First Circuit, which is a one-day-late court, admitted that “[§6020(a)]
returns are rare, and are allowed only at the IRS’s behest.” Id.
243 See IRS Tax Tip 2013-58, supra note 224 (“By law, the IRS may assess penalties to taxpayers for both
failing to file a tax return . . . .”) (emphasis added).
244 KIM, supra note 204, at 3.
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appear to rely almost exclusively on the language of the hanging paragraph,
however, in reaching the conclusion that late-filed tax forms are not returns.245
Although the restrictive nature of this analysis is understandable if the court
was attempting to make a bright-line rule regarding this issue, courts following
this interpretation fail to take into account the fact that Congress chose not to
alter § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii), which is known as the “two-year rule.”246 The two-year
rule allows an individual to discharge a tax debt resulting from a late-filed tax
form as long as the individual files the tax form more than two years prior to
filing a bankruptcy petition.247 Adherence to the notion that a court’s plain
language analysis of a statute must involve analyzing the entire statute also
makes it difficult to reconcile the one-day-late rule with the fact that Congress
chose to specifically explain in the hanging paragraph that tax forms filed
under § 6020(b), which are always filed late, are not returns for
dischargeability purposes.248
1. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Renders the Two-Year Rule Nearly
Meaningless
The two-year rule, which appears in § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) and has long been
considered a statutory requirement for receiving a discharge of income tax
debt, “continues to provide a discharge exception for people who filed their
taxes late, as long as those debtors did not file [tax forms] within the two years
just prior to filing for bankruptcy.”249 Prior to BAPCPA, this clause was
understood to grant debtors the ability to discharge their debt resulting from
late-filed tax returns as long as the debtor filed the return at least two years
prior to filing a bankruptcy petition.250 One of the primary interpretative tools
that courts opposing the one-day-late rule maintain must be consulted is the
canon that every word in a statute has meaning.251 The majority in In re Mallo
even noted that, “we construe statutes ‘so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.’”252 The issue with courts following the one-day-late
245

See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7–10 (majority opinion); In re McCoy, 666 F.3d at 928–30.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
247 See id.
248 See id. § 523(a)(*).
249 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 13 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
250 See In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d 1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Furthermore, only taxes for which a
return was filed more than two years before the petition for bankruptcy are dischargeable.”).
251 See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 488 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
252 In re Mallo, 774 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2014).
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interpretation is that “[i]n adopting the simple rule that a return filed late fails
the test for dischargeability, we have to ask what happened to the language of
§ 523(a)(1)(B) that contains not one but two elements to cause a tax, for which
a return was filed, to be excepted from discharge . . . .”253 While Congress
could have easily removed or amended the language in § 523(a)(1)(B), the
decision not to amend this section must be accounted for because courts
presume that Congress intentionally included every word that appears in a
statute. The one-day-late rule, therefore, does not appear to be the correct
interpretation of the hanging paragraph because it renders the two-year rule
superfluous.
Prior to BAPCPA, the two-year rule was considered to be expansive and
courts generally concluded that the rule was designed to include late-filed tax
forms.254 The Tenth Circuit in In re Mallo attempted to reconcile the hanging
paragraph with the two-year rule and concluded that Congress left the two-year
language in the statute to explain that tax forms filed under § 6020(a) will only
be returns for dischargeability purposes if they are filed two years prior to an
individual filing for bankruptcy.255 Under the one-day-late interpretation, the
hanging paragraph causes the two-year rule to be almost entirely meaningless
because so few individuals are allowed to file under § 6020(a). Courts
following the one-day-late rule even admit that this interpretation renders the
two-year rule almost meaningless.256 These courts claim, however, that this is
acceptable because “while [rendering language] ‘meaningless’ is not okay
under the cardinal rule disfavoring interpretations that render part of a statute
superfluous, ‘all but meaningless’ is fine.”257 Courts following the one-day-late
rule are willing to accept that the two-year rule is rendered almost meaningless
and that the language concerning § 6020(b) is superfluous so that a bright-line
rule can be achieved. Thus, the real issue is that the one-day-late interpretation
simply does too much harm to the plain language of the statute.

253
254
255
256
257

King, supra note 173.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, ¶ 523.07.
774 F.3d at 1324.
See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Mallo, 774 F.3d at 1323–24.
Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 489 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
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2. The One-Day-Late Interpretation Renders the Language in the Hanging
Paragraph Regarding § 6020(a) and § 6020(b) Superfluous
The hanging paragraph specifically differentiates between § 6020(a) tax
forms, which are late-filed forms filed by the IRS with the assistance of the
individual filer, and § 6020(b) tax forms, which are forms filed by the IRS on
behalf of an individual filer without any assistance from the individual. Under
the one-day-late rule, § 6020(b) tax forms would clearly not be returns because
the IRS only files forms on behalf of an individual under § 6020(b) if that
individual missed the filing deadline and failed to respond to subsequent
requests from the IRS. As the IRS stated in its notice opposing the one-day-late
rule,
[i]f the parenthetical “(including applicable filing requirements)” . . .
created the rule that no late-filed return could qualify as a return, the
provision in the same paragraph that returns made pursuant to section
6020(b) are not returns for discharge purposes would be entirely
superfluous because a section 6020(b) return is always prepared after
the due date.258

Courts following the one-day-late rule dismiss this redundancy as irrelevant
and suggest that Congress included the language regarding § 6020(b) to clarify
the statute.259 This interpretation cuts directly against the Supreme Court’s idea
that “we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment
which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.”260
Further, if a § 6020(a) form is the only type of acceptable late-filed form
under the plain language of the statute, then it would necessarily follow that a
§ 6020(b) form would have to be the only type of unacceptable late-filed
form.261 Thus, the only possibilities that do not render the language superfluous
are either (1) Congress included language regarding § 6020(b) as an example
of the only type of late-filed form that is not a return; or (2) Congress sought to
explain that tax forms filed by an individual with the assistance of the IRS (like
a § 6020(a) form) can be a return, while a tax form filed by the IRS on behalf
of a non-compliant individual (like a § 6020(b) form) cannot be a return. If the
one-day-late interpretation is correct, then the first option must be correct or
258

I.R.S. Notice, supra note 114.
See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7 (citation omitted) (“[W]hatever one thinks of this redundancy, it offers
too little to parry the force of the observation that a requirement to file on time is a filing requirement”).
260 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (citation omitted).
261 See supra I.B.
259
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the language regarding § 6020(b) will be superfluous. The alternative
interpretation, which states that late-filed forms can still be a return, is
therefore likely correct because it allows every word in the statute to have
meaning and does not render any aspect of the statute superfluous.
Additionally, the IRS has full discretion to allow individuals to file a
§ 6020(a) tax form.262 While the majority in In re Fahey found “such
[§ 6020(a)] returns are rare,” the court provided one example where a debtor
filed a § 6020(a) return as proof that the one-day-late interpretation is
correct.263 One example of the IRS allowing an individual to file a § 6020(a)
return is hardly convincing evidence that Congress intended to make § 6020(a)
forms the only type of acceptable late-filed returns. Absent any indication
within the statutory text or the legislative history, it seems strange to conclude
that Congress intended to leave debtors at the mercy of the IRS in such a way.
IV. AMENDING THE STATUTE
Congress could resolve this debate by amending the language of the
hanging paragraph to clarify which filing requirements are applicable. One
possible amendment involves substituting the phrase “including an honest and
reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law” in place of the
phrase “(including applicable filing requirements).”264 By codifying the fourth
element of the Beard test, an individual’s debt stemming from a late-filed
return can only be dischargeable if that individual has met all statutory
requirements and has not attempted to defraud the IRS in any way. This would
relieve the In re McCoy court’s worry that individuals are seeking to exploit a
loophole by filing late because courts would be required to review every case
where an individual seeks a discharge to ensure that the individual complied
with the necessary requirements. Filing a form late would therefore not
inherently be an act of wrongdoing, and an individual would be given an
opportunity to provide a reason for the failure to file the tax forms in a timely
manner. This interpretation is more in line with the IRS’s model as well

262 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7 (“Section 6020(a) is a tool for the IRS, invoked solely at its discretion,
when it decides obtaining help from the late filing taxpayer is to the IRS’s advantage.”).
263 See id.
264 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(*) (2012).
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because the IRS waives penalties for late filing if the filer can show a reason
for the late filing.265
This amendment would not cause issues with the language regarding
§ 6020(a) and (b) forms because § 6020(b) tax forms involve an act of
wrongdoing on behalf of the debtor. The IRS only files a § 6020(b) form if an
individual fails to respond to a notice of deficiency.266 A § 6020(a) form is
therefore an acceptable type of return because an individual responds to the
IRS’s request and assists the IRS in filing the § 6020(a) form. A § 6020(b)
form can never be a return because an individual is refusing to help the IRS file
his return, so he should not be eligible to benefit from this decision.
I believe that the notice of deficiency and ability to file § 6020(b) forms are
the “carrots” that Congress sought to give the IRS to collect unpaid taxes. The
notice of deficiency is essentially a warning that an individual is about to run
out of chances to file a tax form without the possibility of further penalties.
Thus, an individual’s failure to respond to a deficiency notice will lead to the
IRS filing a § 6020(b) form on behalf of that individual and will preclude that
individual from receiving a future discharge on his tax debt.
My interpretation is the inverse of the one-day-late interpretation. Courts
following the one-day-late rule maintain that the § 6020(a) form should be a
mechanism by which the IRS chooses who can file their taxes late and still
receive a discharge.267 It is unclear, however, why the IRS, as opposed to the
courts, should have this level of power. Leaving this discretion solely to the
IRS will mainly harm debtors who deserve the opportunity to receive a
discharge but cannot receive one due to the IRS’s lack of resources.
Flipping the interpretation so that an individual’s failure to respond to the
notice of deficiency constitutes an act of wrongdoing, thus precluding a
discharge, would explain why Congress chose to include the language
regarding § 6020(a) and (b). The issue Congress wanted to avoid was
individuals exploiting loopholes in the Code and this interpretation, unlike the

265 See 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) (2012) (“In case of failure to file any return . . . on the date prescribed
therefor . . ., unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there
shall be added to the amount required . . . .”) (emphasis added).
266 See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.
267 See In re Fahey, 779 F.3d at 7 (“Section 6020(a) is a tool for the I.R.S. invoked solely at its discretion,
when it decides obtaining help from the late filing taxpayer is to the I.R.S.’s advantage. That Congress left the
I.R.S. a carrot to offer a taxpayer in such infrequent cases . . . .”).
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one-day-late rule, gives courts the power to determine when an individual has
actually committed some act of wrongdoing. Under this interpretation, the
language regarding § 6020(a) and (b) is necessary in the hanging paragraph
because it explains that tax forms like § 6020(a), which implicate no act of
wrongdoing by the filer, are acceptable returns, while tax forms like § 6020(b),
which implicate failures to respond to the notice of deficiency, are never
returns. Congress provided an example of a late-filed form where the filer did
nothing wrong to highlight that late-filed forms can be returns and provided an
example where a filer committed an act of wrongdoing to show that not all
late-filed forms will be accepted as returns. Congress did not want to punish
otherwise honest debtors who file on April 16th. Congress wanted to punish
debtors who file fraudulent tax forms; file no tax return; or refuse to assist the
IRS in filing a tax return when given the opportunity.
CONCLUSION
Individual debtors should not be precluded from receiving a discharge
solely because they filed a valid tax return late. Although the one-day-late
interpretation sets up an easy-to-apply framework for determining when a latefiled tax form is a return, statutory interpretation is not about reaching an easy
answer. Consequently, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to determine when
an individual’s late-filed tax form meets the requirements to be a return.268
Requiring a case-by-case analysis allows a debtor who filed tax forms late to
still receive a discharge if the debtor can provide evidence that he or she
attempted to comply with the tax law and prevents a discharge in situations
where an individual either had no reason to file late or never filed. This
interpretation balances the IRS’s interest to collect unpaid taxes with both the
debtor’s interest to receive a fresh start and Congress’s desire to close existing
loopholes in the Code. Given the numerous ambiguities in the hanging
paragraph and the policy reasons behind bankruptcy in general, an amendment
to the statute would help clarify Congress’s intent.

268

See Martin II, 542 B.R. 479, 491 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
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Further, the one-day-late interpretation does too much damage to the
language of the statute and runs contrary to the principles of bankruptcy law.
Ignoring the facts that the one-day-late rule renders the § 6020(b) language
superfluous and eviscerates the two-year rule, the rule is too harsh on honest
debtors for no justifiable reason. Barring a discharge in situations where an
individual files a tax form containing all the relevant information one day late
is an extreme departure from the vast majority of courts’ pre-BAPCPA
treatment of discharges. Congress never discussed a strict temporal element,
and courts following the one-day-late rule have gone too far in their plain
meaning analysis to reach a desired conclusion.
The IRS’s goal is to accurately assess individuals’ liabilities and collect
unpaid taxes, while the goal of the Code is to protect creditors and allow
honest debtors to have a fresh start. Presumably, Congress sought to draft the
hanging paragraph so that neither debtors nor creditors were put at an inherent
disadvantage. The one-day-late interpretation is far too harsh on debtors while
an interpretation suggesting that late filing is completely irrelevant would be
too favorable to debtors. As a result, courts should factor the debtor’s reason
for filing late into its analysis of the entire circumstance surrounding the
debtor’s attempt to comply with the tax laws.269
Congress wants the IRS to be able to accurately assess taxpayer liability
and this is best accomplished through a system encouraging individuals to file
returns even if they miss the original deadline. Additionally, the time at which
a debtor files a valid tax return has no real effect on the IRS’s ability to achieve
its goals.270 At the very least, a late-filed form allows the IRS to confirm an
individual’s liability with complete accuracy. Unlike the one-day-late
interpretation, which leaves debtors waiting to file in hope that the IRS will
extend them the chance to file a § 6020(a) return, this alternative interpretation
addresses the reality of the situation that not all late-filers are created equal.271
The correct interpretation of the hanging paragraph is therefore that Congress
intended to codify the Beard test and that every case must be evaluated by the

269

See id.
See In re Maitland, 531 B.R. 516, 520 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).
271 Compare In re Davis, No. 14-26507 (CMG), 2015 LEXIS 3331, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2015)
(noting that a debtor failed to file a tax return in 2005 or 2006; the IRS prepared substitute § 6020(b) forms;
and the debtor did not sign the substitute form and later filed his own returns in 2010), with In re Maitland, 531
B.R. at 517 (noting that a debtor failed to file a tax return in 2008; filed the missing return in 2010; and the IRS
had not filed a substitute return prior to the debtor’s 2010 filing).
270

SAHAROVICH GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

12/15/2016 3:13 PM

TO DISCHARGE OR NOT TO DISCHARGE

267

courts on a case-by-case basis to determine if an individual’s late-filed tax
form meets the requirements to be a return.272
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